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THE PATENT ON-SALE BAR POST-




   Raja Chatterjee* 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the patent on-sale bar is to discourage inventors from 
misusing the patent system and unfairly extending their patent exclusivity 
period. In Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharmaceuticals, the Federal Circuit 
has distorted this doctrine far beyond its purpose. By including non-public 
business transactions within the scope of the on-sale bar, the Federal 
Circuit’s decision contradicts legislative history and express statutory 
language from the America Invents Act (“AIA”). This interpretation also 
makes the U.S. the only major patent system where a non-public sale can 
lead to the forfeiture of an inventor’s patent rights. 
The inclusion of non-public agreements within the scope of invalidating 
prior-art is a particularly harsh result for small pharmaceutical companies. 
These companies routinely enter into private license and supply agreements 
both to raise capital and to ally with experienced industry players who can 
help them navigate through the challenging FDA approval process. The 
Federal Circuit’s Helsinn decision restricts the ability of small 
pharmaceutical companies to collaborate with others, and therefore impedes 
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their ability to innovate. Helsinn also makes the on-sale bar inquiry 
extremely fact-specific and injects unnecessary uncertainty into routine 
business deals. 
This paper suggests that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Helsinn 
misinterprets the AIA’s statutory text, ignores significant legislative history, 
and is logically at odds with the economic realities of the pharmaceutical 
industry. This paper also provides some practical suggestions for how 
pharmaceutical companies can structure commercial transactions without 
stepping on the on-sale bar minefield.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Circuit’s recent application of the on-sale bar1 is unmoored 
from the doctrine’s original purpose2- to prevent inventors from misusing the 
patent system and unfairly removing inventions from the public domain. In 
holding that private business deals trigger the on-sale bar, even ones that did 
not place an invention in the public domain, the Federal Circuit has turned 
the on-sale bar into a trap for the unwary. As evidenced by a spate of recent 
cases,3 the Federal Circuit’s flawed approach to the on-sale bar has been 
especially disruptive for the pharmaceutical (“pharma”) industry. Due to the 
high cost and complexity of drug development, pharma companies 
frequently enter into early-stage business partnerships to fund their research 
activities. These partnerships often take the form of license and supply 
agreements.4 The Federal Circuit’s expansive interpretation classifies many 
of these private agreements as a “sale” for purpose of the on-sale bar.5 A 
“sale” initiates a one-year countdown from the time of the agreement and 
invalidates future patents if an application is not filed within one year. Many 
of the companies entering into such license or supply agreements do not 
recognize the ticking one-year clock, as they do not realize that their 
innocuous business agreements were a “sale” of their inventions. This puts 
pharma companies at risk of losing out on patent protection after spending a 
significant amount of money and time in developing their inventions.6 This 
outcome is exceptionally disastrous as they rely heavily on market 
exclusivity provided by the patent system to recoup their high up-front 
development expenses. By making it harder for small pharma companies to 
continue innovating, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation is detrimental to 
“the progress of science and useful arts.”7 This paper further argues that not 
only is the Federal Circuit’s interpretation detrimental to the pharma 
 
 1. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 2. In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 71 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
 3. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371; Merck & Cie v. Watson Labs., Inc., 822 F.3d 
1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 4. See David Thomas & Chad Wessel, Emerging Therapeutic Company Investment and Deal 
Trends, BIO, 32 (May 2018), http://go.bio.org/rs/490-EHZ-
999/images/BIO%20Emerging%20Therapeutics%20Company%20Investment%20and%20Deal%20Tre
nds%20Report%202008-2017.pdf?_ga=2.45656556.936831433.1543089094-905210238.1524285270. 
 5. See, e.g., Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371. 
 6. See, e.g., id. 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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industry, it also misinterprets statutory text and ignores significant legislative 
history. 
The original intent of the on-sale bar was straightforward.8 The U.S. 
patent system is an elaborate quid-pro-quo system where the inventor offers 
to publicly disclose the invention in return for a period of exclusivity granted 
by the patent. An inventor who has already made an invention available to 
the public by selling it has nothing more to offer in return for the grant of a 
patent. Therefore, the on-sale bar prevents an inventor from obtaining a 
patent if the invention was publicly on-sale for more than a year before filing 
the patent application. The one-year grace-period provides the inventor with 
some leeway to assess the viability of the invention before filing the patent 
application. The on-sale bar also intends to prevent the prejudicial removal 
of “existing knowledge from public use.”9 Judicial interpretations have, over 
time, warped this simple doctrine to its current form where the doctrine is 
unnecessarily expansive and penalizes even those business deals that do not 
make an invention publicly available. Part II of this paper discusses the 
historical underpinnings of the modern on-sale bar, the attempt to fix the 
doctrine through the AIA, and the Federal Circuit’s refusal to acknowledge 
Congress’ statutory fix in Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharm.10 
While other scholars have commented on the on-sale bar in general, 
Part III of this paper identifies some unique issues that this doctrine presents 
to the pharma industry, especially smaller companies. The Helsinn decision 
hamstrings the ability of small pharma companies to raise money for early-
stage research. Post-Helsinn, pharma companies need to be much more 
cautious about structuring agreements to avoid inadvertently triggering the 
on-sale bar. 
Part IV of this paper analyzes the changes made by the AIA to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a) and its impact on the scope of on-sale bar. AIA added the phrase 
“or otherwise available to the public” to the definition of “prior art” in U.S.C. 
§ 102(a)(1).11 This addition signals Congress’ intent to remove non-public 
business deals from the ambit of the on-sale bar. Floor statements from the 
sponsors of the AIA, as well as excerpts from the Congressional report, 
confirm that the updated on-sale-bar applies only to “public sales.”12 This 
section, therefore, argues that the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the on-
 
 8. See In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 71 F.3d 1573, 1577 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 9. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64 (1998). 
 10. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371. 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 12. 157 CONG. REC. 3415 (2011).  
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sale bar is at odds with updated statutory text and defies compelling 
legislative history. 
Part V recognizes that until further guidance is received from the 
Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation is controlling for future 
on-sale bar cases. It summarizes observations from recent Federal Circuit 
case-law to provide suggestions for small pharma companies. It also suggests 
ways to structure business transactions that may avoid setting off the on-sale 
bar minefield. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ON-SALE BAR DOCTRINE 
A. THE STATUTE IS SIMPLE AND LOGICAL 
The statutory on-sale bar was first enacted by Congress in 1839.13 It 
prevented inventors from obtaining a patent if they had placed their invention 
“on-sale” or in “public use,” for more than two years before filing the patent 
application.14  The grace period was changed to one year in 1939, as it 
remains to-date.15  The purpose of the doctrine was simple: it prevented 
inventors from removing inventions from the public sale after the public 
reasonably believed the invention to be in public space.16 The forfeiture of 
the inventor’s patent rights was a direct result of their decision to place the 
invention on-sale or in public use for an extended period of time. The 
doctrine also encouraged the early filing of patents and discouraged 
inventors from keeping their invention secret to unfairly extend the 
exclusivity period. 17  The basics of the on-sale bar remained largely 
unchanged from 1939 until the 2012 enactment of the AIA. Judicial 
interpretation of the statute has, however, varied dramatically over time. 
B. COURTS HAVE STRUGGLED TO APPLY THE ON-SALE BAR 
DOCTRINE 
The primary struggle for courts has been to define when an invention is 
“on-sale” for the purpose of the statute. The earliest and most straightforward 
 
 13. Patent Act of 1839, ch. 88, § 7, 5 Stat. 353, 354 (1839). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Patent Act of 1939, ch. 450, § 1, 53 Stat. 1212 (1939). 
 16. Erol C. Basol, Fabless Semiconductor Companies, the Patent On Sale Bar, and the New 
America Invents Act: Have Fabless Companies Been Shortchanged, or Is Change Coming?, 16 UCLA 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2012). 
 17. Mark Levy, An Analysis of the On Sale Bar and Its Impact on the Structure and Negotiation of 
Development Agreements, 30 U. DAYTON L. REV. 181, 183 (2004). 
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answer to this question was the “on-hand” rule.18 To trigger the on-sale bar, 
the on-hand rule required an invention to be physically manufactured and 
available for sale a year before the patent application was filed.19 Concern 
that inventors would delay physically manufacturing the inventive product 
to unfairly extend their exclusivity period led courts to de-link physical 
reduction to practice from the application of on-sale bar. 20  However, 
defining when a product that did not physically exist was “on-sale” proved 
to be a slippery task for appellate courts. The Federal Circuit cycled through 
the “totality of circumstances test,”21 the “completed invention test,”22 and 
the “substantially complete test”23 in quick succession. Frequent reversals by 
the Federal Circuit, and ensuing confusion in lower courts, convinced the 
Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.24 In Pfaff, 
the Supreme Court created a new two-prong test for the application of the 
on-sale bar.25 The first prong requires an invention to be the subject of a 
“commercial offer for sale,” 26  and the second prong requires that the 
invention be “ready for patenting.”27 
The Pfaff test has, at best, had limited success in reducing confusion 
about when the on-sale bar is triggered. At times, the Federal Circuit found 
that the “ready for patenting” prong is satisfied without proof of 
conception, 28  and at other times, it has required both conception and 
reduction to practice.29  Interpretation of the “commercial offer for sale” 
prong has not fared much better. In some cases, the Federal Circuit has 
looked at the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) to define when a sale 
occurs.30 In other cases, it has relied on the usage of trade and course of 
dealing within a specific industry.31 In Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit held that there is no “supplier” exception to the on-sale bar, 
 
 18. McCreery Eng’g Co. v. Mass. Fan Co., 195 F. 498, 501 (1st Cir. 1912) (noting the substantial 
difference between “an executory contract to construct and to pass title in the future and putting an article 
‘on sale’”). 
 19. Id. at 501–02. 
 20. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 655–56 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  
 21. Id. at 656. 
 22. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 23. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 24. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60 (1998). 
 25. Id. at 67–68. 
 26. Id. at 67. 
 27. Id. at 68. 
 28. Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 29. Robotic Vision Sys. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 30. Lacks Indus. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 31. Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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and an outsourced manufacturing agreement was an invalidating “sale.”32 In 
Medicines Co. v. Hospira, 33  the Federal Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion en banc and found that a manufacturing agreement did not 
involve title transfer and therefore did not trigger the on-sale bar. Congress 
attempted to ameliorate this inconsistent application of the on-sale bar 
through the AIA.34 
C. AIA ATTEMPTS TO SIMPLIFY THE ON-SALE BAR 
The AIA, enacted in September 2012, is the most comprehensive 
reform of the U.S. patent system in decades. This legislation affected the on-
sale bar through an update to the definition of “prior art.” The AIA defines 
prior-art as inventions that are “patented, described in a printed publication, 
or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention.”35 While the definition uses 
terms similar to the pre-AIA definition, the addition of the phrase “or 
otherwise available to the public. . .” has been considered significant. 
Commentators, some of whom were involved in drafting the AIA, thought 
that this phrase removed secret-sales from the scope of the on-sale bar.36 
They also believed that the policy intent of the on-sale bar was better served 
by removal of secret-sales from its scope.37 Requiring public knowledge also 
makes it easier to identify the critical date when the invention is placed on-
sale, for purpose of the statute, thus providing more certainty to inventors.38 
D. USPTO EMBRACES THE NEW ON-SALE BAR 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) embraced 
the modified scope of on-sale bar by updating the Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”). The updated MPEP states: “The phrase ‘on 
sale’ in AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) is treated as having the same meaning as 
 
 32. Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 33. Meds. Co. v. Hospira, 827 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 34. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).  
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 36. Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 435, 467 (2012); Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its 
Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 53 (2012); Dmitry Karshtedt, Did Learned Hand Get It 
Wrong?: The Questionable Patent Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 VILL. L. REV. 261, 332 
(2012). 
 37. See also Iftikhar Ahmed, What They Don’t Know Shouldn’t Hurt You: Adding a Public 
Knowledge Prong to the On-Sale Bar Helps Provide Certainty to Inventors and Competitors Alike, 45 
HOUS. L. REV. 153, 182–83 (2008). 
 38. Id. at 185 (“Inventors could clearly identify the critical date because they will know if their sale 
has resulted in any public knowledge.”). 
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‘on sale’ in pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), except that the sale must make the 
invention available to the public.”39 Examination guidelines stated that “the 
Office views the ‘or otherwise available to the public’ residual clause of the 
AIA’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) as indicating that secret sale or use activity does 
not qualify as prior art.”40 Since this update to the MPEP, countless patents 
have been granted by the USPTO, many of them relying on the updated 
interpretation of the on-sale bar.41 A controversy related to drug patents, and 
the tussle between novel and generic drug manufacturers, soon invited 
judicial review of this interpretation.42 
E. HELSINN V. TEVA TESTED THE UPDATED INTERPRETATION OF 
THE ON-SALE BAR 
The post-AIA interpretation of the on-sale bar was challenged in a drug 
patent case where the Federal Circuit reversed both the USPTO and the 
District Court of New Jersey to hold that the AIA did not modify the prior 
understanding of the on-sale bar statute. 43  It held that private business 
agreements can still trigger the on-sale bar.44 
Helsinn is a small family-run pharma company that focuses on the 
development of drugs for the treatment of cancer symptoms.45  In 1998, 
Helsinn paid drug giant Roche $10 million to buy the patent for the 
compound palonosetron.46 Helsinn, after extensive research and a phase III 
clinical study, created a stable formulation using this compound.47 The FDA 
approved this formulation as the drug Aloxi® to relieve nausea symptoms for 
patients undergoing chemotherapy.48 Helsinn almost ran out of funds during 
the expensive development process and entered into a license and supply 
agreement with another small company, MGI, to raise additional money. 
 
 39. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2152.02(d) (9th ed. Rev. 1, Nov. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 40. Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor To File Provisions of the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11059, 11062 (Feb. 14, 2013). 
 41. Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 7, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2018 WL 1583031 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(Nos. 16-1284, 16-1787), 2017 WL 3208579. 
 42. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 43. Id. at 1371. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Our Mission and Values, HELSINN, https://www.helsinn.com/about-us/our-mission-and-values/ 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2018). 
 46. Transcript of Trial, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 2015 WL 13404191 
(D.N.J. 2015) (No. 11-3962).  
 47. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at *4–6, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 
16-1284, 16-1787 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 25, 2016), 2016 WL 1698099. 
 48. Id. at *2. 
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MGI agreed to pay an upfront license fee in return for exclusive rights to 
market the final drug upon approval by the FDA.49 Helsinn also promised to 
manufacture and supply the approved drug to MGI.50 The license and supply 
agreements had a strict confidentiality clause aimed specifically at keeping 
the drug formulation out of public space. 51  MGI, in order to fulfill its 
obligations as a public company, disclosed in an SEC filing the fact that it 
had entered into an agreement with Helsinn,52 but redacted all confidential 
information from the disclosure. Teva Pharmaceuticals approached the FDA 
to gain approval for a generic version of Helsinn’s palonosetron 
formulation.53 Helsinn, in turn, sued Teva for patent infringement.54 Teva 
challenged the validity of Helsinn’s patents under the on-sale bar doctrine, 
as the agreement with MGI had been signed more than a year before Helsinn 
filed its patent applications.55 The District Court of New Jersey held that, 
since the license and supply agreement did not make the details of the 
invention public, it could not form the basis for triggering the on-sale-bar.56 
The Federal Circuit reversed the District Court’s holding.57 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the AIA had not updated the on-sale 
bar to exclude non-public sales. The court reasoned that if Congress wanted 
to modify the on-sale bar instead of simply adding a new phrase to the 
definition, “it would do so by clear language.” 58  The AIA’s legislative 
history, indicating Congressional intent to update the on-sale bar doctrine, 
also failed to sway the court’s reasoning. 59  Additionally, Helsinn’s 
confidential agreement was found to constitute an “offer for sale” and 
triggered the on-sale bar.60 The court stated that post-AIA “if the existence 
of the sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly 
disclosed in the terms of sale”61 to trigger the on-sale bar. After the denial of 
a petition for en banc review by the Federal Circuit, Helsinn filed a writ of 
 
 49. Id. at *5–7. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at *9. 
 52. MGI Pharma Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 13, 2001), 
https://www.secinfo.com/dvTEu.465.htm. 
 53. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. CV 11-3962 (MLC), 2016 WL 832089, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 
1356(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 54. Id. at *1. 
 55. Id. at *2.  
 56. Id. at *64. 
 57. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1368. 
 60. Id. at 1371. 
 61. Id.  
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certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which has been accepted for hearing in 
the next term. 
III. THE HELSINN DECISION DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTS THE 
PHARMA INDUSTRY, ESPECIALLY THE SMALLER COMPANIES 
The Helsinn decision can have a significant long-term impact on the 
pharma industry. The high up-front cost of drug development, combined 
with a long regulatory approval process, leaves the pharma industry 
especially susceptible to issues that impact the ability to raise capital and 
protect intellectual property. The Helsinn decision hurts the pharma industry, 
especially small companies on both fronts. 
A. SMALL PHARMA COMPANIES ARE INNOVATIVE AND SERVE AN 
IMPORTANT PURPOSE 
The pharma industry is a vibrant source of innovation that provides 
hope and relief to millions of patients around the world. Expected to grow at 
an impressive rate of five percent over the next five years, the global pharma 
industry is expected to be worth $8.7 trillion by 2020.62 Contrary to popular 
belief, not all pharma companies are multi-billion-dollar behemoths. About 
66 percent of the drugs approved by the FDA in recent years came from 
small and mid-size companies.63 The ability of smaller pharma companies to 
take on more risk allows them to work, not only on potential blockbuster 
drugs, but also those aimed at rare diseases.64 A case in point is Aloxi®, the 
drug that was the subject of the Helsinn case. A large pharmaceutical 
company, Roche, deemed the formulation too risky after unfavorable Phase 
II clinical study results.65 Helsinn, a small family owned drug company, 
stepped in and acquired the formula from Roche.66 It completed Phase III 
trials, obtained FDA approval, and brought the drug to market to help 
patients undergoing chemotherapy.67 
 
 62. Greg Reh, 2018 Global Life Sciences Outlook, DELOITTE, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/life-sciences-and-healthcare/articles/global-life-sciences-
sector-outlook.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2018). 
 63. Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big-pharma-biotech-startups/. 
 64. See Syed Husain & Catherine Hanley, Supporting the Pharma Industry Small Business Growth 
Engine, PHARMA’S ALMANAC, https://www.pharmasalmanac.com/articles/supporting-the-pharma-
industry-small-business-growth-engine (last visited Apr. 28, 2018). 
 65. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at *3–4, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2016 
WL 1698099 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 66. Id. at *4. 
 67. Id. at *4–5. 
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Thus, small drug companies promote innovation. They also fulfill an 
important social purpose by working on drugs that larger companies consider 
too risky. They, however, often lack the financial strength and regulatory 
knowledge to take their innovations to the market without entering into 
partnerships with larger companies. Patent laws should help these companies 
by making it easier to protect and commercialize inventions. Helsinn does 
the opposite. 
B. UNCERTAIN PROTECTION OF PATENTS WILL HURT THE PHARMA 
INDUSTRY AND PATIENTS 
Pharma companies rely heavily on patent protection to recover their 
initial investment before the low-cost generics flood the market. A 
systematic survey conducted across various research-intensive industries, 
showed the pharma industry consistently placed the most importance on 
patent protection.68 Protection of patents cannot, however, be at the cost of 
the ability to raise money for research. Inventing new drugs is an expensive 
business, and the development of a new drug can cost up to $1 billion69 and 
15 years of research. 70  The combination of an expensive development 
process and a long lead-time to market makes it critical for drug companies 
to be able to raise money in early stages of research. Pharma companies often 
raise money by entering into licensing and supply agreements with larger 
companies. Over the last decade, more than $157 billion was raised by 
therapeutic companies through early R&D stage licensing and acquisition 
deals. 71  Smaller pharmaceutical companies gain a substantial additional 
advantage by allying with larger companies which can help them navigate 
the clinical trial and FDA approval process. A study conducted to evaluate 
the determinants of success for clinical trials found that a company’s 
experience with clinical trials has a strong positive correlation with its 
chance of succeeding in meeting the end-points for a clinical trial.72 
 
 68. Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 
3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 783, 796–97 (1987).  




 70. Id. 
 71. See David Thomas & Chad Wessel, Emerging Therapeutic Company Investment and Deal 
Trends, BIO, 5 (May 2018), http://go.bio.org/rs/490-EHZ-
999/images/BIO%20Emerging%20Therapeutics%20Company%20Investment%20and%20Deal%20Tre
nds%20Report%202008-2017.pdf?_ga=2.45656556.936831433.1543089094-905210238.1524285270. 
 72. Patricia M. Danzon et al., Productivity in Pharmaceutical–Biotechnology R&D: The Role of 
Experience and Alliances, 24 J. HEALTH ECON. 317, 332, 337 (2005) (noting that large pharma companies 
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Helsinn’s interpretation of the on-sale bar doctrine penalizes business 
deals that companies use routinely to secure early-stage investment.73 It also 
injects unnecessary uncertainty 74  into otherwise routine business 
transactions and makes it harder for companies to structure investment deals 
without the risk of triggering the on-sale bar. 
While filing a patent application earlier into the development process 
would presumably resolve the on-sale bar problem, the answer is not so 
simple. The long FDA approval process eats into the overall patent 
exclusivity period for pharma companies leaving them a shorter amount of 
time to recover the initial investment. Therefore, drug manufacturers prefer 
to delay filing for a patent until the major clinical trials are complete to 
reduce the time gap between the issuance of a patent and the 
commercialization of the invention.75 Cost also factors into when a patent 
application is filed. A pharma company may assess 200,000 to 1 million 
different compounds before one or two viable candidates emerge for the final 
drug compound.76 Because the average cost of preparing and filing a patent 
is about $60,000,77  it is impossible for small pharma companies to file 
patents for all candidates during the development process. 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the on-sale bar not only impacts 
pharma companies; it may also hurt patients by discouraging research into 
drugs for treating serious illnesses. The ability to protect the patent for a drug 
strongly correlates with areas of focus for the pharma industry. Sometimes 
this correlation has a perverse impact. An example of this perverse impact 
can be seen in recent research related to cancer drugs.78 Between 2009-2014, 
eight new cancer treatment drugs arrived on the market.79 All of these drugs 
were intended for terminally ill patients in the most advanced stages of 
 
have a 30 percent higher chance of success in clinical trials. Small companies may increase their chance 
of success by up to 15 percent if they ally with a large company). 
 73. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(holding that a confidential license and supply agreement triggered the on-sale bar). 
 74. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 16-1284, 16-1787, 2018 WL 
1583031, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2018) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (noting that the on-sale bar is a fact-
specific, case-by-case determination). 
 75. See generally Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from 
Cancer Clinical Trials., 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044(2015). 
 76. JP Hughes et al., Principles of Early Drug Discovery, 162 BR. J. PHARMACOL. 1239, 1248 
(2011). 
 77. Russ Krajec, What Do Patents Actually Cost?, BLUEIRON, https://blueironip.com/what-do-
patents-actually-cost/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2018). 
 78. Derek Lowe, Is the Current Patent System Distorting Cancer Research?, IN THE PIPELINE 
(August 11, 2014), 
http://blogs.sciencemag.org/pipeline/archives/2014/08/11/is_the_current_patent_system_distorting_can
cer_research. 
 79. Budish et al., supra note 77, at 2044. 
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metastasized cancer.80 None of the new drugs that were approved in the same 
timeframe targeted treatment of early-stage patients with localized cancers.81 
At least one study hypothesized that one possible reason for this difference 
might be the length of the clinical study required to obtain approval for such 
drugs.82 While drugs targeted at late-stage patients conclude in a few years 
as a result of shorter incremental life-expectancy of the subjects, studies 
involving earlier stage patients require a longer follow-up period.83 Because 
a longer duration of a clinical study essentially means a shorter duration of 
the patent-protected exclusivity period, private funding sources are hesitant 
to back research that involves early-stage cancer patients.84 As this example 
shows, factors that reduce the strength of patent protection for a drug may 
also reduce the investment of money into drug development. Since Helsinn 
negatively impacts patent protection for new drugs by making it easier to 
trigger the on-sale bar, its impact may go beyond just hurting the pharma 
industry. Helsinn may end up hurting American patients by reducing the pace 
of development for new drugs. 
IV. FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION DEFIES STATUTORY 
TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the post-AIA on-sale bar belies 
plain reading of AIA’s text, undermines Congressional purpose, and is 
unsupported by its legislative history. 
A. § 102(A) INDICATES THAT THE ON-SALE-BAR APPLIES ONLY TO 
INVENTIONS DISCLOSED TO THE PUBLIC 
In direct opposition to the AIA’s statutory text, the Federal Circuit in 
Helsinn decided that the “Purchase and Supply Agreement” was invalidating 
prior art even though it did not make the contents of the invention available 
to the public.85 After summarily rejecting the notion that AIA modified the 
scope of on-sale bar,86 the Federal Circuit incorrectly relied on pre-AIA case 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.at 2045 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2045, 2056. 
 84. Ray Fisman, Why Aren’t There More Cancer Vaccines? Blame America’s Lousy Patent System, 
SLATE (Aug. 26, 2013, 5:45 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/the_dismal_science/2013/08/cancer_treatment_is_am
erican_patent_law_hindering_the_discovery_of_more.html. 
 85. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 86. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371. 
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law. 87  The Helsinn decision spends surprisingly little time on the most 
important tool of statutory interpretation: the plain language of the statute.88 
The AIA updated 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) to prohibit the issuance of a 
patent if “the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public.”89 
As compared to the pre-AIA statute, the phrase “or otherwise available to 
the public. . .” is a new addition.90 The textual arguments, in this case, hinge 
on the relationship of the term “or otherwise available to the public. . .” in § 
102(a)(1) to the preceding term “on sale.”91 The District Court and USPTO 
held that the phrase “or otherwise available to the public” is a series-modifier 
that modifies the term “on sale.”92 The Federal Circuit panel disagreed.93 
This difference in opinion regarding the sentence structure in § 
102(a)(1) does not need to be debated on a clean slate. The Supreme Court 
has already interpreted a similar sentence structure where it held that “[w]hen 
several words are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the 
first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language 
demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.”94 Even the Federal 
Circuit’s own past case law has held that “[w]hen a modifier is set off from 
a series of antecedents by a comma, the modifier should be read to apply to 
each of those antecedents.”95 Recognition of the fact that the phrase “or 
otherwise available to the public” modifies the meaning of “on sale” leads to 
the inevitable conclusion that a sale can only be invalidating when it makes 
the claimed invention available to the public. The Federal Circuit’s holding 
in Helsinn is therefore inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s previous 
holding and the Federal Circuit’s own prior constructions.96 
A further indication of Congress’s intent can be gleaned from the 
change in title for the statutory section describing the on-sale bar. While pre-
 
 87. See Pierce Cty. v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 145 (2003) (“[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, 
we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”). 
 88. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009); see Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 
1367–71. 
 89. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 90. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1368. 
 91. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 92. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. CV 11-3962 (MLC), 2016 WL 
832089, at *45 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 
855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2152.02(d) (9th ed. Rev. 1, Nov. 
2013). 
 93. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371. 
 94. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (2014) (internal citation ommitted). 
 95. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 96. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371. 
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AIA section § 102 was titled “Conditions for Patentability; Novelty and loss 
of right to patent,” 97  the post-AIA section is titled “Conditions for 
Patentability; Novelty.”98 Removal of the words “loss of right to patent” 
signals that the post-AIA statute focuses solely on novelty to define 
invalidating prior art. It no longer focuses on actions by inventors that do not 
affect novelty but may still result in a loss of the right to a patent. Since sale 
agreements that do not disclose the contents of an invention to the public do 
not affect the novelty of the invention, the updated title to § 102 suggests that 
such sales are no longer within the scope of § 102. 
The Federal Circuit primarily based its Helsinn holding on a two-part 
argument. First, the panel held out the premise that private sales were 
historically a bar to patentability by referring to the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Pennock v. Dialogue.99 The panel then argued that Congress would have 
used clearer text if it had wanted to effect a foundational change from this 
historical interpretation.100 This argument fails on both counts. Firstly, the 
reliance on Pennock is misplaced. Pennock, a case prior to the codification 
of the on-sale bar statute, addressed a sale which did disclose the invention 
to the public.101 It involved the sale of a new method of connecting two hose-
pipes intended to reduce leakage.102 While the initial sale of the invention to 
a manufacturer was private in nature, the claimed invention was apparent as 
soon as products embodying the invention were sold.103 The Supreme Court 
confirmed that a patent can be granted for inventions “not known or used by 
the public, before the application.”104 The case further states that the patent 
law’s grant of a monopoly is not appropriate if the “public were already in 
possession and common use of an invention[.]”105 Pennock strongly supports 
the proposition that, historically, the on-sale-bar doctrine and its statutory 
logic applied only to uses and sales that made the invention available to the 
public.106 Secondly, the Federal Circuit argued that since Congress re-used 
 
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 98. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 99. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1369 (“[f]ailing to find such a [private] sale invalidating. 
. .would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts.”) ( quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 
27 U.S. 1, 10 (1829). 
 100. Id. at 1371 (stating that “[i]f Congress intended to work such a sweeping change to our on-sale 
bar jurisprudence and wished to repeal . . . [these prior] cases legislatively, it would do so by clear 
language” (internal quotations omitted). 
 101. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at 14.  
 102.  See Pennock, 27 U.S. 1 at 3. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 19. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
 106. Dmitry Karshtedt, The Riddle of Secret Public Use: A Response to Professor Lemley, 93 TEX. 
L. REV. 159, 163 (2015). 
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the term “on-sale” when enacting the AIA, it also intended to re-use the 
historical scope for the on-sale bar. This argument is contrary to Supreme 
Court precedent that held that the presumption that Congress meant to give 
a term its previously held meaning is true only “when it re-enacts a statute 
without change.”107 Since the AIA was not a re-enactment, but a large-scale 
overhaul of the statute, the panel’s argument is not convincing. Additionally, 
the text of the statute was supplemented with the phrase “or otherwise 
available to the public,” which is a clear signal of Congress’ intent to remove 
private sales from the ambit of the on-sale bar. 
An additional glimpse into the Federal Circuit’s reasoning comes from 
the concurrence written by Judge O’Malley to the court’s denial of Helsinn’s 
petition for en banc review. Judge O’Malley’s primary assertion was that 
“on sale” was not modified by the phrase “or otherwise available to the 
public.”108  Instead, the phrase is an independent catch-all provision that 
encompasses all other ways an invention can be disclosed to the public.109 
While this argument initially seems plausible, it suffers from a fatal flaw. In 
articulating her argument, Judge O’Malley only accounted for a part of the 
phrase that was added by Congress. The complete phrase states, “or 
otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention.”110 If Judge O’Malley’s interpretation is correct, even the second 
part of the new phrase—“before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention”—would not apply to the terms “on sale,” “in public use,” and 
“described in a patented publication.” Thus, a public use or description in a 
patented publication will be invalidating even if the use or publication 
occurred after the effective filing date of the invention. This is an illogical 
result. Therefore, Judge O’Malley’s interpretation cannot be correct. 
The policy reason articulated by Judge O’Malley is similarly weak. The 
concurrence correctly identifies that the removal of inventions from public 
domain was not the only ill intended to be addressed by the on-sale bar.111 
The bar was also intended to prevent an unfair extension of the patent 
exclusivity period by the inventor.112 While this would have been a fair 
argument in the pre-AIA patent statute, it does not hold water post-AIA. Pre-
AIA, it is conceivable that an inventor could unfairly extend the patent 
exclusivity period by not filing a timely patent application. They would be 
 
 107. Lorilland v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978). 
 108. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., Nos. 16-1284, 16-1787, 2018 WL 1583031, 
at *3 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2018) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (applying the last antecedent doctrine). 
 109. Id. 
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 111. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 2018 WL 1583031, at *5. 
 112. Id.  
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secure in knowing that their claim would still take priority over a subsequent 
inventor who independently invented and applied for a patent on the same 
subject matter. The on-sale bar would be a necessary tool to reach the fair 
result by denying patent protection to an inventor who had not filed an 
application for a year or more after they commercialized their invention. The 
AIA, however, replaced the first-to-invent patent system with a first-to-file 
system.113 Post-AIA, an inventor who files an application first can obtain a 
patent even if their inventive activity occurred later in time.114 Knowing that 
another inventor can trump their invention by filing for a patent first removes 
the incentive for inventors to delay filing a patent just to extend their 
exclusivity period. Thus, the on-sale bar is no longer a necessary tool post-
AIA to prevent an unfair extension of the patent exclusivity period by 
inventors. 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the on-sale bar does not find any 
support in the text of the statute and does not have any compelling policy 
underpinnings. It should, therefore, be reversed. It is also wholly 
unsupported by the AIA’s legislative history. 
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY INDICATES THAT THE FEDERAL 
CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE ON-SALE BAR UNDERMINES 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
While not a statement of the law, legislative history can be an extremely 
valuable aid in “our understanding of a law.”115 In deciding that the post-
AIA on-sale-bar included secret sales, the Federal Circuit ignored 
compelling legislative history and ignored floor statements from the lead 
sponsors of the AIA, Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman Lamar Smith. 
Senator Leahy said that the statute would “do away with precedent under 
current law that private offers for sale or private uses of secret processes . . . 
may be deemed patent-defeating prior art.”116 His colleague, Congressman 
Lamar Smith, concurred, stating: “[C]ontrary to current precedent, in order 
to trigger the bar in the new [Section] 102(a) in our legislation, an action 
must make the patented subject matter ‘available to the public’ before the 
effective filing date.”117 
 
 113. Vance Woodward, Patent Innovation: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Has Introduced 
Many Welcome Reforms to American Patent Law, 38 L.A. LAW. 21, 21 (Mar. 2015). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018). 
 116. 157 CONG. REC. 3415 (2011). 
 117. 157 CONG. REC. 9782 (2011. 
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The Federal Circuit not only ignored floor statements, it also discounted 
committee reports that the Supreme Court has found to “represen[t] the 
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in 
drafting and studying proposed legislation.”118 The AIA, enacted as H.R. 
1249, was legislated in response to the House Report H.R. 112-98.119 This 
report, which neither of the Federal Circuit opinions considered, states that 
“the phrase ‘available to the public’ is added to clarify the broad scope of 
relevant prior art, as well as to emphasize the fact that it must be publicly 
accessible.”120 The House Report, H.R. 112-98, also states in its discussion 
related to § 102(a)(1) that “[p]rior art . . . will typically include all art that 
publicly exists prior to the filing date, other than disclosures by the inventor 
within 1 year of filing.”121  Similar sentiments are also expressed in the 
Senate Colloquies that documents opinions presented by senators who 
sponsored the AIA. Senator Kyl specifically warned against the type of 
interpretation that the Federal Circuit reached by saying “[a] contrary 
construction of section 102(a)(1), which allowed private and non-disclosing 
uses and sales to constitute invalidating prior art, would be fairly disastrous 
for the U.S. patent system.”122 Senator Leahy stated his understanding that 
“disclosure” under § 102(a)(1) is synonymous with “public disclosure.”123 
Senator Leahy further clarified by saying that “and by a ‘public disclosure’ 
I mean one that results in the claimed invention being ‘described in a printed 
publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public.’”124 
These statements from sponsors of the Leahy-Smith bill, supported by 
the finding of the House Report, provide compelling evidence that Congress 
made a conscious decision while updating the definition of prior art in 
§102(a)(1) to remove non-disclosing, non-public sales from the category of 
invalidating prior art. This evidence is further strengthened by the complete 
absence of any floor statements, or recorded opinions of Senators or 
Congressmen, opposing this stance. 
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C. THE ON-SALE BAR FOR NON-PUBLIC SALES IS OUT OF SYNC 
WITH INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAWS 
The “sense of Congress” provisions in the AIA state that one of its goals 
is to “promote greater international uniformity and certainty in the 
procedures. . .”125 The Federal Circuit’s interpretation that a non-public sale 
can trigger a bar to patentability is in direct opposition to this stated goal. A 
review of the patent systems in other major jurisdictions, that along with the 
United States account for 90 percent of worldwide patent filings,126 shows 
that forfeiture of patent rights due to commercial transactions that do not 
publicly disclose the invention is unique to the U.S. patent system. A quick 
summary is presented below for prior art definitions in the non-U.S. IP5127 
countries. 
Europe: European patent law does not envision something as prior art 
unless it is “available to the public . . . by use, or in any other way . . . before 
the date of filing of the European patent application.”128 The European Patent 
Board of Appeals demonstrated this principle by holding that the sale of a 
microchip containing the inventive program did not constitute invalidating 
prior art when “the principle underlying [invention] is not discernible [to the 
public] by inspection.”129 
China: In Chinese patent law, prior art encompasses inventions that are 
“known to the public both domestically and abroad before the date of 
application.” 130  The disclosure of an invention made by selling an 
embodiment can only serve as prior art if it makes the “technical content 
available to the public.”131 
 
 125. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 3(p) (2011-2012). 
 126. See IP5, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-
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percent of all patent filings). 
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 129. EPO Case Number T 0461/88  (Apr. 17, 1991), available at http://www.epo.org/law-
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 130. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 22 (1984) (amended Dec. 2008), available at 
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 131. Guidelines for Patent Examination, (promulgated by the State Intellectual Property Office of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2010), ch. 3 § 2.1.2.2, available at 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlsqzn/sczn2010eng.pdf (China). 
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South Korea: South Korea defines prior art as an invention that is 
“publicly known or executed in the Republic of Korea. . .”132 where the 
definition of “executed” includes the act of selling the invention.133 
Japan: Japan utilizes a definition like South Korea for prior-art 
“inventions that were publicly known in Japan [or] publicly worked in Japan 
or a foreign country, prior to the filing.”134 The definition of “working” 
includes “producing, using, assigning, etc.”135 
Helsinn’s interpretation of the on-sale bar is unlike that in any of the 
other IP5 countries. It, therefore, cuts against Congress’ stated intent to 
harmonize the U.S. Patent system with the rest of the world. The Federal 
Circuit’s interpretation of the on-sale bar, as exemplified in Helsinn, is 
contrary to the AIA’s text, legislative history, and Congressional intent. It is, 
however, the applicable law until the Supreme Court or Congress steps in to 
overrule Helsinn. Pharma companies should be cautious about structuring 
any license and supply agreements so that they do not trigger the on-sale bar 
as per Federal Circuit’s current case law. 
V. TIPS TO NAVIGATE THE CURRENT ON-SALE-BAR MINEFIELD 
The Helsinn decision has not only made it harder for small pharma 
companies to raise capital, it has also injected uncertainty into otherwise 
routine commercial transactions. Post-Helsinn, the on-sale bar inquiry is 
extremely fact specific where “[e]ach case [is] decided based on its own 
facts.”136 Helsinn did, however, identify some common factors in Federal 
Circuit decisions where the on-sale bar was found not to be applicable. It 
noted that “the absence of the passage of title, the confidential nature of a 
transaction, and the absence of commercial marketing of the invention all 
counsel against applying the on-sale bar.” 137  Similarly, the Medicines 
decision found that the “absence of title transfer [and] the confidential nature 
of the transactions” counsels against application of the on-sale bar even 
though it is not of “talismanic significance.”138 Utilizing the common factors 
 
 132. Patent Act, Act No. 950, Dec. 31, 1961, amended by Act. No. 14112, Mar. 29, 2016, art. 29(1) 
(S.Kor.). 
 133. Id. at art. 2(3). 
 134. Tokkyoh [Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, amended by Law No. 36 of 2014, art. 29(1) 
(Japan). 
 135. Id. at art. 2(3). 
     136. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371. 
 137. Id. at 1364. 
 138. Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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noted in Helsinn and Medicines, this section will provide some suggestions 
on how to structure transactions to sidestep the on-sale bar minefield. 
A. AVOIDING TITLE TRANSFER MAY AVOID TRIGGERING THE ON-
SALE BAR 
Federal Circuit case law has consistently looked to the UCC to 
determine what activities constitute “sale.” 139  The UCC defines sale as 
“passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.”140 The Federal 
Circuit panel in Helsinn found that the supply agreement drafted by the 
parties triggered the on-sale bar as it “expressly contemplated” the passage 
of title.141 In contrast, the Federal Circuit en banc found that a manufacturing 
services agreement did not trigger the on-sale bar because there was an 
“absence of title transfer.”142 Similarly, transactions that resemble “potential 
or eventual marketing,” rather than “actual commercial marketing” of 
inventions, do not trigger the on-sale bar.143 
Therefore, license agreements and distribution services agreements that 
allow investors to derive commercial benefit from a patent without 
transferring title can be used to avoid the on-sale bar. Federal Circuit case-
law differentiates between transactions that transfer legal rights in the 
invention from ones that transfer title in products embodying the 
invention. 144  For example, a license agreement that transferred process 
know-how and contemplated the sale of “resultant products” manufactured 
by the licensee did not trigger the on-sale bar.145  Similarly, the Federal 
Circuit has found that transfer of “production rights in the invention”146 or 
“the exclusive right to market the invention” is not a sale of the invention 
itself, and therefore does not trigger the on-sale bar. While it avoids the on-
sale bar minefield, the licensing agreement approach has other limitations. 
Getting a license to a technology is not the same as getting a commercial 
product, and the licensee must still invest in infrastructure to produce a 
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sellable product. While some licensees may be open to such an investment, 
others may still prefer to directly obtain sellable units from the inventor. 
Similarly, a distribution services agreement leaves the title, and therefore 
risk of the product, with the inventor and may be less preferable to a sale 
agreement where the risk of the product transfers to the buyer upon delivery 
of the product. 
B. AN INDEFINITE AGREEMENT FOR FUTURE SALES MAY NOT 
TRIGGER ON-SALE 
Some licensees/investors do not wish to manufacture the patented 
product themselves. As a result, it is common to pair a license agreement 
with a future supply agreement where the inventor manufactures and 
supplies products that the licensee can sell. If a future supply agreement 
contains definite terms, it may qualify as an “offer for sale” and therefore 
trigger the on-sale bar. A case in point is Helsinn where a letter of intent 
(“LOI”) that contained “specific terms, such as price, method of payment, 
and method of delivery . . . constituted a commercial sale or offer for sale for 
purposes of [on-sale bar].”147 Conversely, agreements that do not contain all 
terms required for a definitive agreement do not trigger the on-sale bar, as 
seen in Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharm., Inc.148 The transaction in Elan 
Corp. was structured with an upfront license/royalty fee with payments tied 
to the inventor achieving certain milestones such as filing the New Drug 
Application, approval by the FDA and patient enrollment in the clinical 
study. As is common in such deals, the license agreement was paired with a 
future supply agreement. The inventor agreed to supply the patented drug 
product to the licensee at a bulk price that allowed an “initial gross margin 
based on current [drug] prices of not less than 70 percent after taking into 
account [the] processing charge.” 149  The Federal Circuit noted that this 
agreement “lacked any mention of quantities, time of delivery, place of 
delivery”150 and “[u]ntil the formulation had been finalized . . . there was no 
way it could [be] determined what . . . the offering price would be.”151 The 
on-sale bar was not triggered in this case due to the lack of specificity in the 
agreement.152 The opposite outcome occurred in a different case where an 
inventor agreed to provide the investor with a fixed percentage of their 
 
 147. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1365–67 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 148. 366 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 149. Id. at 1338. 
 150. Id. at 1341. 
 151. Id. at 1342. 
 152. Id. 
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worldwide requirements (quantity term) at reasonably competitive prices 
(price term).153 Here, the agreement was found to be specific enough to 
qualify as an offer for sale, thus triggering the on-sale bar.154 The Federal 
Circuit has summarized this distinction by stating that an agreement for 
future supply “rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale” when it 
contains all necessary contractual terms and a party “could make [it] into a 
binding contract by simple acceptance.”155 
These cases suggest that LOIs that stop short of defining all terms 
required to give rise to a binding contract may avoid triggering the on-sale 
bar. LOIs can be a valuable tool to document the present agreement between 
the parties and create a jumping-off point for future negotiations. LOIs can 
document the terms that the parties have already agreed to and leave some 
terms for the parties to negotiate after the patent application has been filed.156 
Any concerns regarding the enforceability of an LOI during future 
negotiations can be alleviated through the inclusion of a “good-faith 
negotiation” clause.157 Good-faith negotiation clauses are enforced by courts 
and obligate both parties to conduct future negotiations in good faith and in 
accordance with agreed-upon terms that are documented in the LOI. 158 
Therefore, use of LOIs can enable parties to proceed with a transaction by 
agreeing on critical terms while leaving the overall agreement indefinite until 
a patent application is filed, thus side-stepping the on-sale bar minefield. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the on-sale bar is not only built 
on a faulty legal rationale, it also defies any discernible public policy. In 
reaching this faulty interpretation, the Federal Circuit misread the statutory 
text of 35 U.S.C. § 102 and refused to take advantage of the AIA’s legislative 
history. The Federal Circuit’s reasoning also discounts Congress’ conscious 
decision to add a new phrase “or otherwise available to the public” to the 
definition of prior-art. In negating the changes introduced by the AIA, 
Helsinn particularly injures small pharma companies by hurting their ability 
to obtain early-stage funding. By making it harder for small pharma 
companies to keep producing innovative new drugs, this decision not only 
hurts the industry but also puts patients at a disadvantage. Until the Supreme 
 
 153. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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 156. EQT Infrastructure Ltd. v. Smith, 861 F. Supp. 2d 220, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 157. SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 345 (Del. 2013). 
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Court reverses Helsinn, and provides a more practical application of the on-
sale bar, companies should carefully structure their supply agreements, 
manufacturing agreements, and license deals to avoid triggering the on-sale 
bar. Entering into license and distribution services agreements that avoid 
transfer of title may avoid application of the on-sale bar. Similarly, using 
LOIs that leave some terms open for future negotiation instead of entering 
into definitive contracts may avoid triggering the on-sale bar. 
